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Abstract
We analyze product market competition between firm owners where the risk-neutral
workers decide on their efforts and, thereby, on the output levels. Various worker
compensation schemes are compared: a piece-rate compensation scheme as a bench-
mark when workers’ output performance is verifiable, and a contest-based as well
as a tournament-based compensation scheme when it is only verifiable who the best
performing worker is. According to optimal designs, all the considered compensation
contracts lead to an equal market outcome. Therefore, it depends decisively on the
relative costs of organizing a monitoring device, a contest, or a tournament whether
the one or the other compensation scheme should be implemented.
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11 Introduction
Standard principal-agent models, as discussed in business economics, usually concen-
trate on a firm’s internal organization and analyze compensation contracts between
a single principal, a firm owner or a manager, and one or more agents, the workers.
In industrial economics, compensation contracts are studied in terms of strategic
delegation and competition. However, in contrast to the standard principal-agent
models, the agents are usually managers not workers. Güth, Pull and Stadler (2011,
2015) and Stadler and Pull (2015) combined these two strands of literature and ana-
lyzed the design of piece-rate and contest-based compensation contracts for workers
when the firms compete in a heterogeneous product market. This enabled the au-
thors to extend the business economics models on the one hand and to enrich the
industrial economics models on the other hand.
The present paper follows this approach and considers competing firms, each con-
sisting of one owner and several workers who decide on effort levels anticipating
how these decisions affect their effort costs. We simplify the setting by assuming a
homogeneous product market but complement the former analyses by also studying
tournament-based compensation schemes. While piece rates are based on workers’
verifiable output performance, contest-based and tournament-based compensation
schemes can be implemented even if worker output is not verifiable. In order to
implement such compensation schemes, owners only need information on the work-
ers’ relative performance. Our study shows that, in case of risk-neutral agents, the
market outcome of piece-rate compensation can be reproduced by contest-based as
well as by tournament-based compensation schemes. Therefore, it depends decisively
on the relative costs of organizing a monitoring device, a contest, or a tournament
whether the one or the other compensation scheme should be implemented.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyze piece-rate compensation
schemes as a benchmark. In Section 3, we consider contest-based compensation
schemes, in Section 4 tournament-based compensation schemes. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
22 Piece-Rate Compensation
We adopt a simplified setting of Stadler and Pull (2015) and consider a homogeneous
product market with two firms i = 1, 2. The inverse market demand function reads1
p = 1− qi − qj , i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j .
The single input factor of production is the effort ei,k of workers k = 1, ..., ni in firms
i = 1, 2, where the effort-cost function is assumed to be quadratic, c(ei,k) = e2i,k/2.
The output of firm i is a linear aggregation of the worker effort levels and amounts
to qi =
∑ni
k=1 ei,k.
Each firm consists of one owner and ni workers. The piece-rate compensation game
(P) has two stages. In the first stage, owners i = 1, 2 simultaneously offer observable
and irreversible piece-rate contracts Γi = fi + wiei,k to their workers, specifying
the fixed (positive or negative) salaries fi and the piece rates wi per output unit.
Workers are awarded according to these contracts and suffer from the effort costs of
production. They realize the net utilities
Ui,k(ei,k) = fi + wiei,k − e2i,k/2 , i = 1, 2, k = 1, ..., ni . (1)
In the second stage of the game, workers maximize their net utilities (1) with respect
to their efforts ei,k. The first-order conditions imply
e∗i,k = e∗i = wi (2)
for all workers k = 1, ..., ni employed by firms i = 1, 2. This gives the net utilities
Ui,k(e∗i ) = fi + w2i /2. When the reservation utilities, resulting from compensation-
contract offers in other markets or from unemployment benefits, are given by U ,
owners will pay the lowest feasible salaries fi = U − w2i /2.
1The inverse market demand function can be derived from the consumers’ quasi-linear quadratic
utility function W (q0, q1, q2) = q0+q1+q2−(q21+q22)2/2, where the quantities q1 and q2 are offered
by the firms i = 1, 2, respectively, and q0 is the quantity of the numéraire good.
3This leads to the firm owners’ profits
πi(wi, wj, ni, nj) = (1− qi − qj − wi)qi − nifi
= (1− nie∗i − nje∗j − wi)nie∗i − nifi
= [1− (ni + 1/2)wi − njwj]niwi − niU , i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j . (3)
In the first stage of the game, owner principals maximize their profits by offering
optimal compensation contracts to their workers, specifying the fixed salaries fi, the
piece rates wi, and - in the long run - the number of employed workers ni.
We distinguish two cases, one with an exogenously given number of worker agents
(as usual in standard principal-agent settings) and one with an endogenous long-run
equilibrium number of employed workers.
The piece-rate compensation game in the case of an exogenously given number of
workers
Principals maximize their profits (3) with respect to the piece rates wi. The first-
order conditions are
[1− (2ni + 1)wi − njwj]ni = 0 . (4)
Given the symmetric number n1 = n2 = n of workers per firm, the equilibrium piece
rates and workers’ efforts amount to
wP = eP = 13n+ 1 , (5)
leading to the market price
pP = 1− 2neP = n+ 13n+ 1
and the firm profits
πP = (2n+ 1)n2(3n+ 1)2 − nU . (6)
4While worker efforts do not depend on the reservation utility U , the firm profits are
decreasing in U . Some numerical calculations for n1 = n2 = n workers per firm and
a common worker reservation utility of U = 0 are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Results for the piece-rate compensation game (P) with a given number n
of workers per firm and the reservation utility U = 0
n wP eP pP πP
2 0.143 0.143 0.429 0.102
3 0.100 0.100 0.400 0.105
4 0.077 0.077 0.385 0.106
5 0.063 0.063 0.375 0.107
6 0.053 0.053 0.368 0.108
... ... ... ... ...
∞ 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.111
The piece-rate compensation scheme reproduces the market performance of unitary
firms. This can be seen from the profit equation (3) which is strategically equivalent
to the profit equation of unitary firms being able to decide directly on worker efforts
via enforceable contracts. This equivalence holds since there is no strategic effect of
the piece rates offered by one firm on the efforts of the rival firm’s workers.
The piece-rate compensation game in the case of endogenously determined employ-
ment levels
When firms are not constrained by a given number of workers, they additionally
maximize their profits with respect to the number ni of employed workers. The
corresponding first-order conditions are
[1− (2ni + 1/2)wi − njwj]wi − U = 0 . (7)
5Taking into account the first-order conditions (4) for the piece rates wi, we obtain
the equilibrium number of employed workers
nP = 1−
√
2U
3
√
2U
(8)
and hence the equilibrium piece rates and efforts
wP = eP =
√
2U (9)
in terms of the workers’ reservation utility only. Given the worker efforts, it is
straightforward to derive the market price
pP = 1 + 2
√
2U
3
and the firm profits
πP = (1−
√
2U)2
9 . (10)
These solutions are well-known from the standard Cournot duopoly model (see, e.g.,
Belleflamme and Peitz 2015, chapter 3), when the firms’ unit production costs are
given by w =
√
2U . Table 2 shows the numerical calculations for an endogenous
number of workers per firm. In order to ensure intra-firm interaction, i.e. n ≥ 2, we
assume that U ∈ [0, 1/98].
The fixed salaries prove to be fP = 0 such that the compensation contracts offered
by both of the firm owners to each of their workers are specified as Γi =
√
2U ei.
A comparison with Table 1 shows that worker efforts coincide. However, the firm
profits are reduced for all positive reservation levels U > 0 enforcing higher worker
compensations.
6Table 2: Results for the piece-rate compensation game (P) with endogenously
determined employment levels
U¯ nP wP eP pP πP
1/98 2 0.143 0.143 0.429 0.082
1/200 3 0.100 0.100 0.400 0.090
1/338 4 0.077 0.077 0.385 0.095
1/512 5 0.063 0.063 0.375 0.098
1/722 6 0.053 0.053 0.368 0.100
... ... ... ... ... ...
0 ∞ 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.111
Piece-rate compensation schemes can only be implemented when the workers’ abso-
lute performance is verifiable. In practice, an appropriate monitoring device is often
not available at a sufficiently low cost. Rather, owners may only be able to measure
relative worker performance, e.g. through a contest or a tournament.
3 Contest-Based Compensation
As an alternative to piece-rate compensation we now consider contest-based com-
pensation schemes. As is well-known, there are several institutional set-ups appro-
priate to convert agents’ efforts into winning probabilities in contests (see, e.g.,
Konrad 2009). These approaches make a strong case for the contest-success function
µi,k = ei,k/(
∑ni
k=1 ei,k) = ei,k/qi, where µi,k denotes the probability of worker k to
win the contest of firm i.2
2This is a special case of the more general Tullock contest-success function µi,k =
eri,k/(
∑ni
k=1 e
r
i,k), where the ranking-precision parameter is normalized to r = 1.
7As a dynamic justification, assume the winning worker is the one who is observed
to be the first to reach a certain amount of production in the contest race. Then it
is plausible to specify the probability of winning as ei,k/(
∑ni
k=1 ei,k), which simplifies
to 1/ni in a symmetric equilibrium.
Stadler and Pull (2015), inter alia, have considered a contract design with fixed
firm-specific contest prizes Vi where the winners take all. This contest-based com-
pensation game (C) has again two stages: in the first stage, owners i = 1, 2 simulta-
neously offer compensation contracts to their workers, specifying the fixed (positive
or negative) salaries fi and fixed contest prizes Vi. Workers are awarded according
to the contracts Γi = fi + Vi when winning the contest and Γi = fi when losing. All
workers participating in the contest expect the net utilities
EUi,k(ei,k) = fi + (ei,k/qi)Vi − e2i,k/2 , i = 1, 2, k = 1, ..., ni . (11)
In the second stage of the compensation game, the risk-neutral workers maximize
their expected net utilities with respect to their efforts ei,k. From the first-order
conditions, we obtain the efforts
e∗i,k = e∗i =
√
(ni − 1)Vi/ni (12)
for all workers k = 1, ..., ni employed by firms i = 1, 2. The efforts depend positively
on the firm-specific contest prizes Vi and, in contrast to the piece-rate compensation
game, negatively on the number of workers ni. This implies the expected net utilities
EUi,k(e∗i ) = fi + [(ni + 1)/(2n2i )]Vi.
When the reservation utility is again given by U ∈ [0, 1/98], workers receive the
fixed salaries fi = U − [(ni + 1)/(2n2i )]Vi such that the profit functions of the firms
can be written as
πi(Vi, Vj, ni, nj) = (1− nie∗i − nje∗j)nie∗i − nifi − Vi
= (1− nie∗i − nje∗j)nie∗i − niU − [(ni − 1)/(2ni)]Vi , i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j .
(13)
8In the first stage of the game, owner principals maximize their profits (13) by offering
an optimal compensation contract to their workers, specifying the fixed salaries fi,
the contest prices Vi, and - in the long run - the number of employed workers ni.
The contest-based compensation game in the case of an exogenously given number
of workers
Given the fixed number n1 = n2 = n of workers per firm, the first-order conditions
with respect to the contest prizes Vi imply
V ∗ = n
2
(n− 1)(3n+ 1)2 . (14)
Substituting Vi = V ∗ and ni = n into (12) leads to the workers’ effort
eC = 13n+ 1 , (15)
which coincides with eP as derived in equation (5) for the piece-rate compensation
scheme. The market performance with piece-rate contracts is therefore reproduced
by this contest-based contract with a fixed contest prize for the winning worker.
The contest-based compensation game in the case of an endogenously determined
employment level
This result continues to hold when we endogenize the equilibrium number of workers
per firm. By maximizing the profits (13) with respect to the number of employed
workers and taking into account (14), we obtain the equilibrium employment levels
nC = 1−
√
2U
3
√
2U
(16)
and hence the equilibrium contest prizes
V C = 2(1−
√
2U)2U
3(
√
2U − 8U)
. (17)
9Substitute (16) into (15) to obtain the equilibrium effort
eC =
√
2U ,
which coincides with the equilibrium worker effort (9) as resulting in the case of
piece-rate compensation. Table 3 shows the numerical calculations for an endogenous
number of workers per firm.
Table 3: Results for the contest-based compensation game (C) with endogenously
determined employment levels
U nC V C eC pC πC
1/98 2 0.082 0.143 0.429 0.082
1/200 3 0.045 0.100 0.400 0.090
1/338 4 0.032 0.077 0.385 0.095
1/512 5 0.024 0.063 0.375 0.098
1/722 6 0.020 0.053 0.368 0.100
... ... ... ... ... ...
0 ∞ 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.111
The fixed salaries prove to be
fC = − 12U
2
√
2U − 8U
.
V C > 0 implies that
√
2U−8U > 0 and therefore fC < 0. This negative fixed salary
is the price workers have to pay in order to participate in the contest.
4 Tournament-Based Compensation
As a further compensation scheme, we now consider tournament-based contracts.
Similar to a contest, a tournament is a competition between the firms’ workers
10
who show effort to gain a prize. To explain the difference between contests and
tournaments, Taylor (1995, p. 874) refers to the example of motor-car races: A
contest is like ’Indianapolis 500’ (try to be the first to go the allotted distance of 500
miles), while a tournament is like ’Le Mans’ (try to be the farthest in the allotted
time of 24 hours).
The tournament-based compensation game (T) has two stages: in the first stage,
owners i = 1, 2 simultaneously offer compensation contracts to their workers, spec-
ifying the fixed (positive or negative) salaries fi and fixed tournament prizes Vi for
the winners of the tournaments. Workers are awarded according to the contracts
Γi = fi + Vi when winning the tournament and Γi = fi when losing. All workers
participating in the tournaments expect the net utilities
EUi,k(ei,k) = fi + µi,kVi − e2i,k/2 , i = 1, 2, k = 1, ..., ni , (18)
where µi,k denotes the probability of worker k to win the tournament of firm i.
Again, there is a stochastic component in tournaments which determines the best
performing worker even if the equilibrium efforts of all workers are equal. When a
worker exerts effort ei,k, his tournament performance as perceived by the owner is
assumed to be ei,k + εi,k, where εi,k are identically and independently distributed
random variables with mean zero. In contrast to the standard rank-order tournament
as introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981), we assume that the observation of the
tournament result is disturbed by the stochastic noise term, but not the workers’
production process itself.
To keep the model tractable, we assume the uniform distribution F (εi,k) = εi,k/σ+
1/2 on the support εi,k ∈ [−σ/2, σ/2] such that the density ∂F (εi,k)/∂εi,k = 1/σ is
constant. The variable σ > 0 is a measure of observation noise (see the illustration
in Figure 1). In the limit case where σ approaches zero, this noise is negligible
such that worker effort is verifiable and piece-rate or even enforcement contracts are
feasible. Increasing values of σ indicate increasing observation noise with respect to
the workers’ output performance.
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Figure 1: The distribution function of the observation-noise variable εi,k
−σ/2 0 σ/2
1/2
1
εi,k
F (εi,k)
A worker who exerts effort ei,k, while all other workers in firm i exert the equilibrium
effort e∗i , wins the tournament with probability3
µi,k =
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
F (ei,k − e∗i + εi,k)(ni−1)(1/σ)dεi,k , i = 1, 2, k = 1, ..., ni .
The derivative with respect to the effort ei,k is
∂µi,k/∂ei,k =
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
(ni − 1)F (ei,k − e∗i + εi,k)(ni−2)(1/σ)2dεi,k .
3The general probabilities for the different ranks in the tournaments depending on the distri-
bution functions of the error term are presented in Akerlof and Holden (2012).
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In the symmetric equilibrium (ei,k = e∗i ), this derivative simplifies to
∂µi,k/∂ei,k =
∫ σ/2
−σ/2
(ni − 1)F (εi,k)(ni−2)(1/σ)2dεi,k
=F (εi,k)ni−1(1/σ)|σ/2−σ/2 = 1/σ ,
which depends proportionally on the density 1/σ of the uniform distribution, but
not on the number ni of employed workers per firm.
Taking into account this derivative, it is straightforward to show that the first-order
conditions of maximizing the expected net utilities (18) are
e∗i,k = e∗i = Vi/σ (19)
for all risk-neutral workers k = 1, ..., ni employed by firms i = 1, 2. This implies the
expected net utilities EUi,k(e∗i ) = fi + (1/ni)Vi − [1/(2σ2)]V 2i .
When the reservation utility is again given by U ∈ [0, 1/98], workers receive the
fixed salaries fi = U − (1/ni)Vi + [1/(2σ2)]V 2i such that the profit functions of the
firms can be written as
πi(Vi, Vj, ni, nj) = (1− nie∗i − nje∗j)nie∗i − nifi − Vi
= (1− nie∗i − nje∗j)nie∗i − niU − [ni/(2σ2)]V 2i , i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j .
(20)
In the first stage, owner principals maximize their profits (20) by offering an op-
timal compensation contract to their workers, specifying the fixed salaries fi, the
tournament prizes Vi, and - in the long-run - the number of employed workers ni.
The tournament-based compensation game in the case of an exogenously given num-
ber of workers
Given the fixed number n1 = n2 = n of workers per firm, the maximization of the
profit functions (20) with respect to the tournament prizes Vi leads to the first-order
13
conditions
V ∗ = σ3n+ 1 . (21)
Substituting Vi = V ∗ into (19) leads to the workers’ effort
eT = 13n+ 1 , (22)
which coincides with eP and eC as derived in equations (5) and (15) for the previous
compensation games. The market performance with piece-rate contracts can there-
fore also be reproduced by this tournament-based contract with a fixed prize for the
winning worker.
The tournament-based compensation game in the case of an endogenously determined
employment level
This result continues to hold when we endogenize the equilibrium number of workers
per firm. By maximizing the profits (20) with respect to the number of employed
workers and taking into account (21) and (22), we obtain the endogenous number
of employed workers per firm
nT = 1−
√
2U
3
√
2U
, (23)
which coincides with the employment levels nP in (10) and nC in (16). Substitution
into (21) gives the equilibrium tournament prizes
V T =
√
2U σ , (24)
which are monotonically decreasing in the density 1/σ of the noise parameter. Sub-
stituting (23) into (22) gives the worker effort
eT =
√
2U ,
14
which coincides with the worker effort in the previous compensation games. As a
consequence it holds that pT = pC = pP and πT = πC = πP . Table 4 shows
the numerical calculations for an endogenous number of workers per firm for the
intermediate noise parameter σ = 1.
Table 4: Results for the tournament-based compensation game (T) with
endogenously determined employment levels (σ = 1)
U¯ nT V T eT pT πT
1/98 2 0.143 0.143 0.439 0.082
1/200 3 0.100 0.100 0.400 0.090
1/338 4 0.077 0.077 0.385 0.095
1/512 5 0.063 0.063 0.375 0.098
1/722 6 0.053 0.053 0.368 0.100
... ... ... ... ... ...
0 ∞ 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.111
The fixed salaries prove to be
fT = − 2(3σ − 1 +
√
2U)U
1−
√
2U
and are monotonically increasing in the density 1/σ. In the extreme case of the den-
sity approaching zero (i.e., σ →∞), extremely high tournament prizes are necessary
to encourage worker effort. In the opposite extreme case of an infinitely high density
around mean zero so that uncertainty becomes negligible (i.e., σ = 0), no further
incentive from tournament prizes is necessary. It is clear from the workers’ partic-
ipation constraints that high tournament prizes go along with low (and possibly
negative) fixed salaries and vice versa.
Regardless of the type of the compensation scheme, the optimal designs (fP and wP
in the case of piece-rate compensation, fC and V C in the case of a contest, and fT
15
and V T in the case of a tournament) induce the same number of employed workers,
the same worker effort and, hence, the same market performance. Therefore, the
adequate compensation scheme depends decisively on its relative implementation
costs.
5 Summary and Conclusion
This paper studied product market competition between firms where owners decide
on the number of employed workers and implement a compensation scheme to which
worker agents react by choosing efforts and, thereby, output levels. Depending on
the verifiability of workers’ absolute or relative performance, firm owners can offer
a piece-rate, a contest-based, or a tournament-based compensation scheme in order
to maximize their profits.
In practice, a verification of workers’ absolute output performance is often not pos-
sible so that piece-rate contracts are not feasible. However, a contest-based com-
pensation scheme that only relies on the verifiability of contest performance or
a tournament-based compensation scheme that only relies on the verifiability of
tournament performance can be implemented. Under the assumed risk-neutrality of
workers, the different compensation schemes lead to the same performance of the
owner principals and the same expected payments for the worker agents.
Therefore, whether a monitoring device, a contest, or a tournament should be im-
plemented, is a question of the relative differences in the organization costs. Since
a perfect monitoring device usually proves to be very expensive, this might explain
the attractiveness of contests and tournaments in theory and practice.
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